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<p>
on that week's sabbath-gasbag shows (as calvin trillin calls them), someone is
certain to furrow his brow and declaim that thursday's blackout confirms, to a
newly heightened degree, the american electrical grid's vulnerability to
terrorism. not that that necessarily was a terrorist attack, the expert will
concede (though with a cocked eyebrow, to suggest that, then again, maybe it
was), but what if it had been? look, he will say, at how much damage the
terrorists can cause. certainly the blackout dramatizes the fragility of our
overloaded, archaic, unevenly managed electrical-transmission system. but it
also reveals the system's—and society's—resilience. we have had, in one swoop,
the largest blackout in u.s. history, wiping out electrical power for some 50
million people, including much of the northeast corridor and the core of the
nation's financial network. and yet, less than 24 hours later, most (though by
no means all) of the power has been restored. financial markets were scantly
affected, if at all. in new york city, just one person died (of a heart attack,
after walking down many flights of stairs in a midtown skyscraper); the police
recorded just three cases of looting, all minor; by thursday evening, planes
were flying in to the area's airports. police, firefighters, and
emergency-management crews worked with few disruptions. (some statistics:
police responded to 80,000 911 calls, more than twice the normal number;
firefighters fought 60 fires and made more than 800 elevator rescues; ems crews
responded to 5,000 calls, 600 more than the previous record-high.) government
officials—on city, state, and federal levels—communicated with one another,
with almost no hitch, thanks in part to procedures put in place after the sept.
11 terrorist attack. the point is: as big a deal as that blackout was (and, to
some degree, still is), the streets did not erupt in panic; society remained
fairly orderly; the wheels of government and finance turned. if that had been a
terrorist attack, or if terrorists dream of inflicting such damage as this, one
thing can be said: it did not unleash terror. major inconvenience, yes; terror,
not remotely. that said, could a terrorist have caused that blackout or cause
one like it in the future? doubtful. as of late friday afternoon, the
executives and engineers who run the electrical network still don't know
precisely where or how the trouble began. if they don't know how to find the
precise vulnerability that caused such widespread damage, would anyone in
al-qaida know? last summer, the naval war college commissioned gartner, a
connecticut-based information-technology research group, to spin scenarios for
a "digital pearl harbor"—a systematic attack on the nation's critical
infrastructure networks: finance, transportation, telecommunications, the
internet, and energy. the group dealing with the electrical network envisioned
a two-pronged attack: first, the physical destruction of key transmission
bottlenecks, followed by sabotage through the internet of the digital systems
that allow supervisors to switch transmission flows on and off, and thus
blocking them from restarting the power after the attack. regardless of whether
such an attack is feasible, that certainly is not what happened thursday. no
physical damage was done (or at least none was reported), and the digital
systems that restart the flow of power are working fine. in other words, the
blackout reveals nothing, one way or the other, about the network's
vulnerability to terrorism. however, it is worth noting that invading key nodes
of the electrical network, whether by hacking or whacking, is very difficult
and getting harder. (for an elaboration of that point, click here.) according
to a spokesman for the north american electric reliability center, hackers try
to intrude on some aspect of the grid's computer network on a daily
basis—never, so far, with any success. it's also worth noting that the digital
networks are not connected nearly as widely as the transmission networks; even
if someone managed to muck up one digital center, it would have limited effect.
none of that is to warrant complacency, either about the electrical grid's
ability to supply enough continuous power or about its security from terrorists
and pranksters. just last tuesday, nerc issued a new protocol for enhancing
cyber-security standards, and when it comes to such matters, there's no such
thing as excessive caution. however, if we are vulnerable, the blackout
probably tells us nothing new about why or how; if anything, it offers
reassurance that society is more durable than many scenarios about terrorism
suppose.
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